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Abstract: We present an Agent-Based Model (hereaer ABM) for a pharmaceutical supply chain operating un-
der conditionsofweak regulationand imperfect information, exploring thepossibilityofpoorqualitymedicines
and their detection. Our interest is to demonstrate how buyers can learn about the quality of sellers (and their
medicines) based on previous successful and unsuccessful transactions, thereby establishing trust over time.
Furthermore, this network of trust allows the system itself to evolve to positive outcomes (under some but
not all circumstances) by eliminating sellers with low quality products. The ABM we develop assumes that ra-
tional and non-corrupt agents (wholesalers, retailers and consumers) learn from experience and adjust their
behaviour accordingly. The system itself evolves over time: under some — but not all — circumstances, sellers
with low-quality products are progressively eliminated. Three distinct states of the supply chain are observed
depending on the importance of trust built up from past experience. The “dynamic” state is characterised by a
low level of trust leading to a continually changing system with new drugs introduced and rejected with little
regard to quality. The “frozen” state arises from high levels of reliance on past experience and locks the supply
chain into a suboptimal state. The “optimising” state has moderate reliance on past experience and leads to
the persistence of suppliers with good quality; however, the system is still “invadable” by better quality drugs.
Simulation results show that the state reached by the system depends strongly on the precise way that trust
is established: Excessive levels of trust make it impossible for new, improved treatments to be adopted. This
highlights the critical need to understand better how personal experience influences consumer behaviour, es-
pecially where regulation is weak and for products like medicines whose quality is not readily observable.
Keywords: Trust, Africa, Supply Chain, Self-Organization, Drugs, Medicine
Introduction
1.1 Insecurity and permeability of pharmaceutical supply chains constitute a major global public health threat.
Over 10% of pharmaceutical medicines consumed in low/middle-income countries (LMIC) are thought to be
sub-standard or falsified (SF)(WHO 2017b; Almuzaini et al. 2013; Kaur & Singh 2016; Newton et al. 2017; Nayyar
et al. 2012), containing little or no active ingredient (WHO, 2017a; b), with rates of over 30% reported in parts of
Sub-Saharan Africa. The term ’SF’ covers dierent kinds of threats to medicine quality: deliberate falsification
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(usually profitmotivated); sub-standard productionwith insuicient quality control; and post-manufacture de-
terioration (Hamilton et al. 2016) the result from the end-user perspective is the same: a poor quality drug
that will have limited therapeutic eect. Antibiotics and antimalarials are thought to be particularly vulner-
able, causing directly an estimated 72,000 to 267,000 ’excess’ under-5 deaths annually(Renschler et al. 2015;
WHO 2017b,a) and contributing to accelerating antimicrobial resistance through exposure of pathogens to sub-
therapeutic dosages of antimicrobial agents (Yeung et al. 2015; Sharma et al. 2017; Newton et al. 2016)
1.2 Eorts to tackle the SF medicine threat have addressed both the supply side (tightening regulation, improv-
ing detection rates and prosecuting oenders) and the demand side, though education programmes aimed at
health professionals and the general public (Cinnamond&Woods 2015; Hamilton et al. 2016;WHO2017b). How-
ever, theproblempersists for several reasons. On the supply side, a combinationof limited regulatory resources
(financial/human), endemic malpractice/corruption, and the promise of potentially huge profits, confound ef-
forts to prevent poor-quality medicines entering supply chains Nayyar et al. (2015); Newton et al. (2014). On
the demand side, high disease burdens, poverty and inadequate access to quality-assured essential medicines
Vandam (2016); World-Bank (2017) increase consumers’ vulnerability, especially when high-quality imitations
are extremely diicult to spot, even for professionals.
1.3 This paper represents a first attempt to develop an Agent-Based Model (ABM) that represents this empirically-
observed situation: a complex, self-organising and oen opaque supply chain; with goods of high value but
whose quality cannot easily be observed; and where formal regulatory mechanisms are limited and weak. It
is relatively unusual in ABM in trying to incorporate empirically-derived observations into the model design,
although this is still at a relatively early stage in our work (see later discussion).
Ethnography: The SF Medicine Threat and the Problem of Trust
2.1 In 2015-16, our research team conducted a preliminary empirical (ethnographic) study of pharmaceutical sup-
ply chain dynamics in Ghana and Tanzania, two African countries with relatively well-functioning regulatory
authorities but where the problem of SF medicine penetration persists (with reported SF prevalence rates of
20-40% in Ghana (Fadeyi et al. 2015; Kaur & Singh 2016; Tivura et al. 2016; Wilson et al. 2017) and 2-12% in Tan-
zania (Höllein et al. 2016; Kaur & Singh 2016; Mziray et al. 2017).
2.2 Local teams based respectively at the University of Cape Coast and the Tanzanian National Institute for Medical
Research worked alongside four of the authors (KH, HH, SM, GM) to conduct intensive fieldwork at a variety of
’medicine transaction points’ across pharmaceutical supply chains, ranging from retail outlets (formal and in-
formal sectors) towholesalers and importers. We also interviewed actors operating at dierent points in supply
chains: those directly buying and selling medicines, as well as regulators, enforcers, professional associations,
etc. Altogether, we conducted approximately 500 interviews in Ghana and Tanzania, alongside careful obser-
vations of medicine purchases in pharmacies, over-the-counter retailers andmarket places(Hamill et al. 2019).
2.3 Twomajor insightsweregained fromthiswork,whichunderpinourmotivation tomodel, formally, thesesupply-
chain systems. First, it became clear that medicine supply chains in Ghana/Tanzania are extraordinarily com-
plex and opaque,marked by substantial informational and economic asymmetries, with no single actor having
full information about the entire system. This finding is corroborated by other empirical work on medicine
supply chains in Sub-Saharan Africa, described Mackintosh et al. (2018a) as “spaghetti-like patterns of over-
lapping and multiplying supply chains” (see also Baxerres & Le Hesran (2011); Baxerres (2011); Mackintosh &
Mujinja (2010); Mackintosh et al. (2011, 2018b); Palafox et al. (2014); Patouillard et al. (2010)). Tremblay (2013),
among others, has noted the role of this complexity, within a context of weak regulation, in perpetuating SF
medicine penetration. From amodelling point of view, these supply chains may thus be regarded as complex,
self-organising systems, with no central controlling authority, with the implication that actions/changes at one
point might generate non-intuitive eects elsewhere.
2.4 A second key finding was that where uncertainty over medicine quality is pervasive, trust underpins (at least in
part) transactions and themovement ofmedicines over geographical and regulatory space. In order to transact
or consume a medicine, whose quality cannot be directly observed, actors need to trust (the medicine, the
other party) enough to proceed, given their particular exigencies and constraints. However, the economic and
informational asymmetries noted above, along with dierences in urgency to act, mean that some actors can
aord to be more discerning while others must accept much lower thresholds of trust (Hampshire et al. 2017;
Hamill et al. 2019).
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Supply Chain Modelling: Existing Approaches and Their Applicability to
Pharmaceutical Quality in Sub-Saharan Africa
3.1 The last couple of decades have seen several attempts to model supply-chain dynamics. Most of this work has
sought to represent generic supply chain systems(Garcia-Flores et al. 2000; Fox et al. 2001; Strader et al. 1998;
Tykhonov et al. 2008; Jetly et al. 2012; AbuKhousa et al. 2014; Amini et al. 2012; Tran & Cohen 2004) and has
rarely dealt specifically with issues of uncertainty about product quality. An exception has been some of the
work modelling food supply and safety (McPhee-Knowles 2015; Buurma et al. 2017) However, the assumptions
underpinning McPhee-Knowles’ model - that food contamination occurs randomly across sites rather than fol-
lowing particular suppliers - undermines the premise of our work: that poor-quality medicines penetrate and
spread through supply chains through particular actors (manufacturers, suppliers and retailers), while Buurma
et al’s work deals more with opinion change than actual shis in food quality.
3.2 A second limitation of existingwork is that the assumptions underpinningmostmodels are derived from the ex-
perience of (relatively) well-regulated systems in the Global North, where accurate information is more widely
available and the penalties for legal infringements may be severe. For example, key elements in the model of
Jetly et al. (2012, 2014) are drug innovation and company mergers - more relevant for US markets than those
in Ghana or Tanzania. In the African context (particularly inmore remote areas), transport diiculties and costs
represent a major impediment to eective healthcare delivery. This applies particularly to patients (or con-
sumers of medicines) but also to wholesalers and retailers. Delivery failures and failures to maintain the stor-
age conditions necessary for preservation of drug eicacy are widely recognised features of African healthcare
connected with transportation challenges (Khojah et al. 2013; Umlauf & Park 2018). Models that independently
represent physical space and networks are generally rare in ABM.
3.3 Thirdly, the vast majority of ABM on supply chains are based on assumptions that the supply chain is either
controlled by a single actor or that each element is at best quasi-autonomous, (e.g. Petrovic et al. (1998); Towill
et al. (1992); Tzafestas & Kapsiotis (1994); Strader et al. (1998); Swaminathan et al. (1998)). Our observations and
the other empirical work discussed above suggests that such assumptions cannot bemade about pharmaceu-
tical supply chains in Africa, where each element is not only autonomous but oen competitive, and regulation
of the system as a whole is rarely suicient to ensure global control.
3.4 By necessity, our work is thus more in the tradition of the "self-organising" complex systems approach (Choi
et al. 2001; Geyer & Cairney 2015), for which ABM is particularly well suited. Non-trivial empirical eects emerg-
ing fromself-organisingstructureanddynamicshavebeen investigated inother situations, for example,Mitchell
& Ackland (2007, 2009) demonstrate “boom and bust” time variation with a consumer-supplier model, but
rarely has this been applied to drug supply. The work of Jetly et al. (2012, 2014) on the US pharmaceutical
market is an important exception but, as noted above, the parameters they use are not directly translatable
to the African context; they use three levels of suppliers but no consumers, and deal predominantly with drug
innovation and companymergers. Issues of quality, trust and inspection are also absent from these models.
3.5 Finally, there have been several attempts in ABM to model trust within supply chains and networks (Wang &
Vassileva 2003; Sutclie & Wang 2012; Chen et al. 2015). Tykhonov et al. (2008) present a model with empirical
referents, but they intend their ABM not to represent reality directly but rather the operations of pre-existing
gaming simulations like the “Trust and Tracing Game” and the well known “Beer Game” (Sterman 1989). This
is also the approach taken by Kimbrough et al. (2002). While this is an innovative way to use ABM and access
a dierent kind of data, the danger is that the game does not itself represent reality and, therefore, an ABM
reproducing its behaviour will not do so either. This is a variant on the well known challenge of ecological
validity(Chaytor & Schmitter-Edgecombe 2003) in experiments.
3.6 In summary, we have not been able to identify any previous ABM that adequately capture the empirically-
observed realities of pharmaceutical supply chains in Africa, where formal regulation is weak, quality uncer-
tain, and where no single actor has full oversight. In contrast to more abstract approaches, our ambition is to
develop amodel that describeswith reasonable accuracy the empirical situation in countries likeGhanaor Tan-
zania, rather than being instrumental (solving a technical problem like supply chain optimisation) or serving as
a soware tool.
3.7 Although we are still at an early stage in terms of calibration and validation, this work represents a first step
towards what Gilbert & Troitzsch (2005) refer to as modelling a well defined “target-system”. It is distinct from
more abstract models of phenomena like trust in networks because the dierent roles of customers, whole-
salers and retailers are already explicit in themodel. It also represents supply chains and their self-organisation
explicitly and, albeit in a stylised way, incorporates features that are relevant to the African context (like travel
costs) while excluding others (like innovation and mergers) which are not. While the models described above
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have represented various permutations of trust, quality, inspection, competing actors and self-organising sup-
ply chains, the model presented below is the first ABM to integrate all of these elements because of their rele-
vance to our target system.
Model Design Strategy
4.1 This is a first attempt to build a model of a self-organising supply chain involving the need for trust because of
the possibility of variable drug quality and allowing for some inspection. It is chiefly designed to be simple to
support understandingofwhat is almost certainly a complex (counter-intuitive) system in itsmoredetailed vari-
ants. However, it is also intended to analyse a “self organising” system for which eective policy intervention
is likely to be particularly challenging.
4.2 In designing the model, we had to balance several principles. Generally we tried to keep the model as simple
as possible, particularly where relevant data were lacking. However, we also ensured that the assumptions in
themodel broadly followed - or at least did not contradict - our empirical observations or other publishedwork
on pharmaceutical supply chains in Africa (see above). Sometimes there were tensions between the two. For
example, our ethnographic work suggested that social learning or ’gossip’ may play a role in decision-making,
as people share information and experiences of trying dierent medicines/sellers (Hampshire & Owusu 2013;
Hampshire et al. 2017) However, in this case (and some others) we deliberately simplified the model, partly
because of a lack of readily quantifiable data but also because we wanted to start by developing an eective
understanding of a simplermodel. (In fact, no other researchwe have so far discovered recognises social learn-
ing in the operation of trust in supply chains so this is both an obvious empirical and conceptual development
for later versions of the model.)
4.3 Our model represents three kinds of actors: those who sell only (wholesalers); those who both buy and sell
(retailers), and those that buy only (consumers). The challenge faced by the buyers is to determine which of
several sellers oers the best value, where some factors (e.g. price) are visible and others (drug quality) must
be inferred. However, for a buyer, the number of potential suppliers is larger than can be tested even once. This
means that the model cannot use standard regret minimising algorithms for example (Loomes & Sugden 1982;
Auer 2002; Bubeck et al. 2012; Wang et al. 2009).
4.4 An important ingredient of the model is that all the actors are non-corrupt and therefore seek to weed out any
lowquality drugs that are known to them. We do not propose this to be true; rather this simplifying assumption
ismadeprovisionally to allowus to investigatewhether there are system-level issueswhich canpartially explain
the empirically-observed persistence of SF drugs.
Characterisation of Actors
5.1 The dynamics of the system involve a number of actors in three categories: wholesalers, retailers and con-
sumers. Interaction occurs in discrete rounds in which each consumer makes a purchase. Few of the system
processes and parameters are known for certain by the actors. Sellers (wholesalers and retailers) may, or may
not, have good quality products and may change their pricing strategy. Good quality drugs will not always
produce a satisfactory outcome, while poor-quality ones may still appear to have beneficial eects (through
placebo eects or simply getting better anyway). Where such uncertainty exists, wemodel it stochastically, us-
ing random variables between 0 and 1 labelled η, such that pj = 1 + η means that pj is set to a random value
between 1 and 2.
Wholesalers (labelled k)
5.2 Wholesalers procure large quantities of medicines from domestic and international manufacturers. The drugs
they source have a quality qk = η between 0 and 1.1 Wholesalers also charge a price, given by their own cost
(taken as 1) plus a markup pk = 1 + η. The details of the production process itself (costs of raw materials,
production technologies and so on) are considered outside the model, and the wholesalers neither know nor
check the quality of drugs they source. A wholesaler maintains a stock of drugs and cash which is augmented
by sales and decremented by costs. This stock acts as a hard constraint on what the wholesaler can sell. We
simplify the model by assuming there are no loans, deferred payment arrangements and so on although we
know in practice that this is oen not the case. The bank account of new wholesalers is “primed” by initial
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capital that allows thewholesaler to launch their business and determines how long they can continuewithout
selling anything. The stock, bank account and quality of a wholesaler are not visible to other actors.
5.3 The wholesalers retain their price and quality aer any round in which theymake a profit. If their strategy does
not lead to a sale, it is assumed that they have no information about why it failed. On this basis they generate
a new strategy (qk and pk) at random. Old stock is retained, and when new stock is bought the quality of the
stock becomes aweighted average of old and newbatches. Wholesalers can go bankrupt if they run out of cash
and stock. It is assumed that if a retailer puts in a request for stock, this can always be met within a simulated
time period, provided the wholesaler has suicient cash.
Retailers (labelled j)
5.4 Retailers buy the drugs fromwholesalers and then sell it on to consumers. They hold a stock of drugs (Ij) which
is updated each round by purchasing from their preferredwholesaler. This stock has amean qualityQIj , which
is again a weighted average of the drugs bought and currently unsold. The retailer does not know the value
of QIi and therefore cannot use it to decide a pricing strategy. Retailers have a selling price pj and will sell
to any consumer until their stock is exhausted. They have a physical location which gives them a customer
base determined by the maximum distance consumers can travel and the maximum price they can pay. For
simplicity, in the current version of the model we do not want to deal with the logic of “diversification” so the
retailer will buy only from their preferred wholesaler. They can and will sell to anyone who is interested at
“their” price pj . They start with an initial stock with quality between qk = η and a price pk = qk + η.
5.5 Retailers can also inspect and attempt to evaluate the quality of the drugs which enables them to establish
trust with the wholesaler TWjk . Initially the trust is set to 0 between each wholesaler and retailer. On receiving
a batch of drugs this trust value is incremented by the result of the inspection (qk + η− 0.5) which depends on
actual quality anda randomnumber representing theunreliability of inspection. Thus, on average,wholesalers
with quality greater than 0.5 will enjoy enhanced trust and vice versa. At present retailers do not share the
outcome of the inspection with any other actor, nor learn about the medical outcomes for their consumers, so
trust regarding quality is based only on their own previous experience. Each retailer has a purchasing strategy
sj which determines the relative importance of the price and perceived quality of a retailer j.
Consumers (labelled i)
5.6 Consumers purchase one dose of the drug per round. The success or failure of the medicine is determined
before the next round. Consumers can access drugs from any retailer but they are spatially dispersed and there
is a cost associated with travel (dij). The consumer i uses this information to establish a level of trust with the
retailer j (formally written as a kernel TCij ), trust increasing if the drug is successful and reducing if it is not
(Jonker & Treur 1999). Consumers do not have any direct information about the wholesaler supplying their
retailer. For each retailer, the consumer has a level of trust initially set to 0 and updated each time a drug is
used (based on the outcome). Consequently trust in retailers with drug quality above 0.5will rise and it will fall
for those with lower quality.
5.7 In the simplest version of themodel consumers do not communicate with each other: In this simplifiedmodel,
there is no “gossip” so the possibility of establishing drug quality is based only on the consumer’s direct experi-
ence. It turns out in analysing the simulation that this trust kernel is themajor determinant of systembehaviour
and, for this reason, we will examine dierent updating schemes in the characterisation of the actors.
5.8 We assume that over the length of the simulation run the population of consumers (and their locations) are
fixed. Consumers have a preference for low prices and can pay an absolutemaximumprice of 2 units, reflecting
the very real resource constraints facedbypatients in these settings. Theprice and locationof retailers is known
to all consumers but their stock, strategy and wholesaler is unknown.
Individual Dynamics
Geography
6.1 Weassume there areNk wholesalers, Nj retailers andNi consumers. Transport costs are evaluatedby assuming
that retailers and consumers are equally spaced around a ring (with the cost to travel to a nearest neighbour set
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at d0). Mathematically, this means that with one retailer perNi/Nj consumers the separation between retailer
j and consumer i is
dij = d0Min (|i− (Ni/Nj)j|, |Ni − i+ (Ni/Nj)j|)
where the two options correspond to travelling clockwise or anticlockwise around the ring. (See Figure 1.)
Money
6.2 Each consumer selects a preferred retailer based on price, distance and trust. Each retailer selects a preferred
wholesaler based on price and trust as described below. Money of up to 2 units per transaction enters the
system via the consumers. The money then flows through retailers and is lost from the system as wholesaler
costs.
Wholesalers
6.3 In any given round, the wholesalers can use any cash available from the previous round for further imports
based on to their current quality/cost. Wholesalers must also pay some overhead each round regardless of
whether they trade or not. If the overhead reduces a wholesaler to negative stock, they go bankrupt. Bankrupt
wholesalers are replaced in thenext roundwithanewwholesaler, forwhomall strategies are re-initialised in the
standard way and all trust levels are reset to zero. Consequently, the total number of wholesalers is assumed
to be fixed.
Retailers
6.4 In each round, retailers sell their product reactively to those consumers who choose them. They receivemoney
according to howmuch they sell and the price they sell at. They then invest this money in further stock for the
next round using their preferred wholesaler which is the one oering best value according to
vjk = −pk + sjTWjk
which can be read as: The value oered by wholesaler k to retailer j is the price charged by k plus the trust that j
has in k, weighted by sj .
6.5 Although it would be realistic for retailers to hold both cash and stock, this is an unnecessary complication
within the basic model that does not aect overall behaviour. Thus, at the end of each round all a retailer’s
wealth is held as stock Ij , some of which is then removed as overhead.
6.6 If the retailer fails to make a sale in any round, it revises both its strategy sj and its price pj , changing their
values by a small random amount between ±. If the overhead causes the stock to become negative, the re-
tailer is deemed bankrupt and replaced with a new retailer. New values of pj and sj are generated and all trust
information, both in wholesalers (TW ) and consumers (TC ) is reset to zero.
Consumers
6.7 In each round every consumer evaluates every retailer with a value score given by
vij = −pj − dij + siTCij
which can be read as: The value oered by retailer j to consumer i is the price charged by j plus the travel cost for
i to visit j plus the trust that i has in j, weighted by the importance i places on trust.
6.8 The consumer buys drugs from the retailer oering best value, provided they have stock and the price is below
2 units. The drug is then used and its success assigned a value of qj − ηwhere η is a randomnumber between 0
and 1, and the trust level of the chosen retailer TCij updated accordingly. In the simplest model, consumers all
have the same weighting for the importance of the three factors.
6.9 The structure of the model is shown schematically in Figure 1 with interactions summarised in Table 1.
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6.10 Themodel incorporates the capacity for evolution viaprice changes andbankruptcies. It alsodevelops a “mem-
ory” via the trust kernelsTC andTW .The spatial separationof consumers and regenerationof bankrupt suppli-
ersmakes it diicult for a supply-sidemonopoly to formwhile the existence of numerous consumers precludes
a demand-side monopoly.
6.11 Although the model is deliberately simplified, its aim was to be at least compatible with empirical knowledge.
It is also designed so that certain obvious extensions do not require it to be totally re-engineered. For example,
it would be very easy to “turn o” the eectiveness of drugs that spent more than a certain length of time in
the supply chain or to add external monitoring and “punishment” (fines or seizure that changed costs or led to
supplier closure). Consumers couldbegivendierent levelsofwealth, perhaps reflectedbydierentweightings
for trust and price. The bankruptcy-startup cycle could allow evolving franchises or group level learning, where
the new supplier could copy a successful supplier’s strategy and perhaps inherit its trust network. Horizontal
communication (“gossip”) could allow one consumer to aect another’s trust network. The list goes on but the
purpose of this article is to determine critical drivers in the simplest model as a baseline for future research.
Results and Analysis
Qualitative definition of an optimising state: Nash Equilibrium
7.1 Complex evolving systems can self-organise into an equilibrium steady state under which no actor can improve
their situation by changing supplier (Nash 1951; Taylor & Jonker 1978; VonNeumann&Morgenstern 2007). Such
so-called ”NashEquilibria” canbedeterminedusingGameTheorywith anadditional assumption that all actors
have perfect information. This is not the case in ourmodel, where actors’ information about drug quality come
only through imperfect tests and trust kernels.
7.2 In this subsection, we temporarily assume that evolutionary learningworkswell enough that everyone has per-
fect information. Under this assumption, it is possible to determine the NE analytically. To do so, we divide the
system variables into two groups. The first group (comprising network, prices and quality) defines the sup-
ply chain. The second group (comprising strategies and trust kernels) is the information which drives system
evolution.
7.3 Considering suppliers fromagame-theoretic perspective, we identify the payo functions as “largest profit” for
suppliers, andas lowest price plus highest quality for consumers. The absenceof anydierential transportation
cost or price-quality linkage in the wholesaler-retailer game makes competition purely price-driven Bertrand
(1883): Any price rise is liable to be undercut by another wholesaler until the point where a further price cut
(below costs) leads to bankruptcy, so the wholesaler markup pk − qk is driven to zero2. The consumers prefer
higher quality, which applies an evolutionary pressure on the retailers and thus indirectly on the wholesalers.
Since the sellers’ markup is always driven to zero by the Bertrand competition, there is no profit motive for
lowering quality, so the game-theoretic equilibrium quality q = 1.
7.4 The retailer-consumer game is more complicated. The pressure from consumers for high quality drugs and the
indierence (at worst) of the retailer again drive the equilibrium to top quality q = 1. The transportation costs
ensure many retailers can co-exist. If the retailers could charge dierent prices to dierent customers then
Bertrand competition would drive the markup towards being equal to the dierential transport costs pji =
qj + (dij+1 − dij) where dij+1 is the distance to the second closest retailer. However, we assumed uniform
pricing. To analyse this situation in general, we define n = Ni/Nj , the number of consumers per retailer. We
consider a situation where all retailers have the same price p and quality q. Their income is then pn. To attract
an additional buyer, a retailer would have to lower the price by do/2 to compensate for the extra travel cost3.
Their new income will be (p− d0/2)(n+ 1) and this process will be favourable until
pn = (p− d0/2)(n+ 1)
.
7.5 Solving for p gives the equilibrium price to the consumer of p = (n + 1)d0/2. If this is higher than 2, the price
will saturate at 2.
7.6 ThisNE involvinghighqualitydrugsandprofitable retailerswouldbeachieved in thecaseofperfect information
i.e. if the trust kernel fully represented the quality of the drugs. We will investigate by simulation whether our
system of agents reasoning on imperfect information can nonetheless approach this “Optimising” state.
7.7 Themodel was coded in under 100 lines of Fortran, available as open data from the corresponding author.
JASSS, 22(2) 5, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/2/5.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3984
Consumer Retailer Wholesaler
Price buys < 2 sells @ pj sells@ pk
Location i 10j -
Trust in Retailer TCij Wholesaler TWjk
Trust based on recovery (imperfect) testing -
Importance of trust si sj -
Connect to Retailer Consumer, Wholesaler Retailer
Buy information Trust, price, location Trust, price -
Strategy change - bankruptcy bankruptcy
Inventory drug quality qj qk
Table 1: Summary of actors and their properties. There is a distinction between the algorithm controlling how
a decision is made (“Strategy”) and the data used by the algorithm (“Buy information”).
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of the connections between actors, showing consumers (blue circles, i), retailers
(red squares, j = 1, 4) and wholesalers (green triangles k = 1, 2). Black lines show links from consumers who
rate retailer 4 best value - some geographical bias is indicated. Links to other retailers are omitted for clarity.
Brown lines show actual (thick) and possible (thin) supplies from wholesalers to retailers. In the text, we use
theword “supplier” tomean “both retailer andwholesaler”. Weuse “buyer” tomean either retailer dealingwith
wholesaler or consumer dealing with retailer, and vice versa for “seller”.
7.8 It is fairly straightforward to characterize possible outcomes from the model which appeared compatible with
our ethnographic observations.
7.9 Some are trivial. For example, if distances dij are too large, each consumer will access only their nearest re-
tailer: a situation that pertains in many parts of rural Africa where healthcare facilities are sparse and public-
sector stock-outs common such that, in practice, a single local retailer is the only available source ofmedicines
(Hampshire et al. 2011, 2016; Mackintosh et al. 2018b) Similarly, behaviour in the initial rounds of the system is
very sensitive to the exact initial conditions: since these are chosen randomly, nothing specific can be learned
before the system has time to evolve. In general, the long term limit of an evolving system, based on the as-
sumptions wemade, involves three distinct types of end state:-
• “Dynamic”: Newwholesalers and retailers are continuously introduced. Buyers keep swapping suppliers.
There are large fluctuations and no long-term trend in average quality and price.
• “Frozen”: The supply chain is highly dependent on the initial conditions. Retailers and wholesalers who
gain market share early retain a dominant position.
• “Optimising”: The supply chain reaches a stable state which is invadable by new wholesalers or retail-
ers with “better” strategies and proceeds towards an Evolutionarily Stable State independent of initial
conditions.
7.10 The possibility of an “Optimising” outcome arises from the existence of an Evolutionarily Stable Statewhich the
systemwill tend toward. This is the theoretical Nash Equilibrium.
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Figure 2: Time evolution for the average quality of drugs from individual runs under twomodels for establishing
trust. The system contains 10wholesalers, 100 retailers and 1000 consumers with d0 = 0.01. 10 runs were done
with the “cumulative” trust kernel (green circles) and the running average kernel (red triangles). Bankruptcies
can be observed in this figure from sudden changes in the evolution: the “frozen” states reached by the “cumu-
lative” trust kernel have no bankrupcies; in the “dynamic” state, bankruptcy becomes less common as quality
increases.
7.11 We begin by comparing two dierent models for the evolution of the trust kernel based on actors’ experiences
(Jonker & Treur 1999) to explore the robustness of the wider results.
7.12 In the first, shown with green circles in Figure 2, trust at round n is incremented cumulatively according to
Tn = Tn−1 + q + η − 1
2
where T and q are the trust and quality respectively. The same equation applies to both wholesaler-retailer
and retailer-consumer interactions so the indices are suppressed. The increment represents howwell the drug
performs (with the random variable η − 12 representing the uncertainty of the testing/curing process). Trust in
this model will over time, on average, become ever larger for any drug of above average quality.
7.13 This model generates the “frozen” state with suppliers charging low prices and q > 0.5 becoming dominant.
Thus although the supply chain is self-organised to provide drugs of above average quality, once frozen it is im-
possible for a supplier of better quality drugs to break in. Aer some examination of parameter sensitivity in the
model, we identified the unbounded trust function as the cause. Initially, when no trust has been established,
price and distance are themain determinants of system behaviour. High priced retailers fail to make a sale and
the high price strategy is eliminated. If a buyer chooses a retailer with quality below q = 0.5, aer several vis-
its their trust will drop and the buyer will switch supplier. Thus low quality drugs are eliminated. However, any
drugoeredwhich is better than q = 0.5 tends to increase trust in that retailer. Since the retailer andassociated
wholesaler are both making sales, they each retain their strategies. Since the consumer never goes elsewhere,
trust in other retailers remains at 0.5 even if they in fact havebetter quality. So apositive feedbackprocess locks
the consumer into a suboptimal arrangement. The suppliers with the highest quality drugs may never get to
make the initial sale which enables them to establish trust.
7.14 In the secondmodel, shown with red circles in Figure 2, the trust kernel is an estimate of how good the drug is.
Mathematically it is a running average of how well the drug performs:
Tn =
mTn−i + q + η − 12
m+ 1
wherem is the number of previous interactions between the agents. Since Tn is bounded by 0 and 1, its eect
on decision-making cannot become dominant and the possibility of changing supplier is ever present.
7.15 Figure 2 displays a representative sample of ten runs with each trust model, showing how the mean quality
of the drugs reaching consumers is increased as the trust kernels are established. There is considerable scat-
ter in the outcomes but several common features can be discerned. In the first 20 iterations, there is a strong
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Figure 3: Statistically averaged time evolution for the average quality < q > of drugs as a function of weight
placed on trust si. The system contains 10 wholesalers, 100 retailers and 1000 consumers with d0 = 0.01. The
standard deviation of individual runs is ±0.1. 10000 runs were done to reduce statistical error to ±0.001. Six
graphs show dierent weightings for the importance of “trust” si = sj = s. A reasonable one parameter fit can
be achieved with (1− q)−1 = A ln twhich implies that the quality is tending to 1. The cumulative trust model
(dashed line) gives rapid initial improvement but mean quality saturates at a lower value than for any level of
limited trust si.
increase in mean quality. The green “cumulative” method gives a slightly faster quality improvement on aver-
age. At longer times, the quality using the “cumulative”method becomes frozen in.4 By contrast, with the (red)
bounded trustmodel it is possible for higher quality drugs to break into themarket even very late in a run, espe-
cially when the overall quality is low. The graph shows a “punctuated equilibrium” dynamics where the system
appears stable for time but aer a bankruptcy it is then invaded by a new drug. The bankruptcy eliminates a
failing strategy, and if the new entrant also has a bad strategy they will also be immediately eliminated. Figure
2 shows that new strategies which become established are usually of higher quality, though sometimes a low
price can compensate.
7.16 The trust kernel operates in two places, between consumers and retailers and between retailers and whole-
salers. We investigated the relative importance of these. Figure 4 shows that trust in the retailer-wholesaler
interaction ismuchmore eective in eliminating SF than in the retailer-consumer one. The upper four curves in
the figure also show that price to the consumer drops over timeas a result of the price competitionbuilt into the
model. Competitive price reductions are slower when trust in quality is givenmore weight in decision making.
More interestingly, if retailers ignore quality they aremore eective in driving down prices than consumers can
be.
7.17 Figure 2 shows considerable variation between runs which implies the uncertainty involved in any empirical
observation. Amore robust descriptionof themodel is givenby statistical averages overmany such runs (Figure
3). Here we see the unrelenting eect of including flexible learning and trust in driving the system to supply
higher quality drugs (coloured curves) compared with purely price driven or overly trusting strategies (black
solid and dotted lines). This slow increase of average quality arises from rare but rapid changes in individual
runs.
7.18 A fit to the data suggests that, in the very long term, the system with the flexible learning kernel tends toward
the Nash Equilibrium (p = q = 1). Although consumers do not have anything like the complete information
assumed for the analytic derivation of the Nash Equilibrium, the system overall (including its capacity to self-
organise) has “learnt” enough information to achieve it.
Three final states
7.19 We characterise the outcome of the model in terms of three final states. Which state is obtained depends
strongly on how “value” and “trust” are determined, andweakly on the system size and initial conditions. Nev-
ertheless, we can summarise the general rules.
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Figure 4: Relative eectiveness of consumer-retailer versus retailer-wholesaler trust in reducing price (upper
curves) and improving quality (lower curves) towards the Nash Equilibrium, which is 1 in each case.
Frozen state
7.20 A ’frozen’ state occurs when trust is the dominant factor in value judgement, and is achieved too quickly by any
above-average products. The “cumulative” trust kernel tends to lead to this state. The trust kernels continue
to change, but the buying decisions do not. New retailers appear in the system, but are unable to attract cus-
tomers and quickly become bankrupt. The system’s failure to “learn” arises from the lack of information, due
to consumers not investigating enough dierent retailers. In this state, the system provides drugs of mediocre
quality at low prices and does not improve over time. We observed this situation during our fieldwork in more
remote rural areas, where a small number of suppliers operate and survive in business for long periods(Hamill
et al. 2019).
Dynamic state
7.21 The system always passes through a dynamic state, in which new suppliers are investigated and the trust ker-
nels are established. The dynamic state is permanent when the weight of the trust kernel is zero or testing is
unreliable. In the dynamic state, a number of processes are occuring: buyers change suppliers, new retailers
appear and may become established. Quality tends to improve over time, but progressively more slowly. Typ-
ically, there are two timescales: the time between wholesalers introducing a new, better drug and the time it
takes for retailers of that drug to gain increased trust and custom. At long times, improvements in the quality
of the “best drug on the system” are small, and the system’s failure to reach an optimal state arises from the
consumers not acting strongly enough on the information available.
7.22 In our fieldwork, this state was most closely represented by the mass of informal traders operating in Accra’s
(in)famous ’Drug Lane’ (Okaishie), where there is a rapid turnover of traders and products. In model terms the
equalization of transportation costs of co-located retailers increases competition based on price and quality.
Optimising state
7.23 This is defined as the Evolutionary Stable State in the simulationwhich is equivalent to the Nash Equilibrium of
analytic theory. The optimised state delivers the lowest possible prices and highest possible quality. This ide-
alised state was never observed in a simulation, but for intermediate levels of trust, the dynamic state evolves
towards it. However, the closer it gets, the slower the rate of improvement. This state most closely resembles
western pharmacies, where diligent regulation leads to strong and accurate levels of trust.
Discussion and Conclusions
8.1 We designed a simple model for a self-organising supply chain for pharmaceutical drugs which attempted to
balance simplicity, existing modelling ideas and compatibility with ethnographic fieldwork in Ghana and Tan-
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zania. The system is characterised by incomplete information at all levels. It oers the possibility for buyers to
discover the quality of the drugs supplied by sellers based on inspections or medical outcomes, both of which
are subject to stochastic error.
8.2 We identified three possible states of the system, “dynamic”, “frozen” and “optimising”. With no learning/trust
possible, the “dynamic” state occurred with retailers and consumers continually changing suppliers. The vari-
ant involving the “cumulative” trustmodel had a dynamic phase duringwhich quality improved but eventually
the supply chain became frozen. The bounded trust model remained in a dynamic state, evolving slowly to-
wards the Nash Equilibrium, both in terms of high quality and low price.
8.3 We have found that introducing the ability to learn from experience and establish a trust network does serve
to eliminate low quality drugs from the supply chain. Unfortunately, too strong a dependence on trust also en-
trenches the supply ofmediocre drugsmaking it impossible for better quality products to become established.
Dierent assumptions for changing the supply chain, pricing, determining seller strategies and so on were of
secondary importance to the trust model. The model assumed that consumers were price sensitive but not
resource limited so increasing personal wealth is not in a position to unfreeze the system.
8.4 Counter-intuitively, to get a better outcome, someway is needed tomake consumers “take a chance” on drugs
of which they have no personal experience, eschewing those that have already earned their trust. Intriguingly,
parallel analysis of our ethnographic research points to a similar conclusion. In a context of high uncertainty
and high ’stakes’ (i.e. potentially severe negative consequences of making a wrong decision), many of the ’con-
sumers’we interviewedsought todevelop long-termrelationshipsof trustwithparticularmedicine retailers (re-
tailers did the same with their suppliers). Our empirical work suggests that, once such a relationship had been
established, there were very strong social incentives not to challenge it, even to the extent of deliberately over-
looking possible indicators that cast doubt on the trustworthiness of the other party. These socially-embedded
practices can underpin community cohesion, but may have the unfortunate consequence of entrenching pos-
sibly untrustworthy suppliers andmedicines within supply chains (Hamill et al. 2019).
8.5 Within themodel, trust established by retailer testingwasmore eective than that established by consumer ex-
perience. This is so despite the quantitative eectiveness of the evaluation being the same. We can understand
this because themodel assumes that SFmedicines enter at thewholesaler level: the retailer inspection impacts
directly on choice ofwholesalerwhile consumer pressure acts only indirectly by eliminating retailerswhomade
a poor wholesaler choice. (A caveat: if the SF drug is introduced lower in the supply chain then supplier testing
cannot prevent it.) Price competition at any level of the chain has the eect of reducing prices.
Model outcomes and implications
8.6 Having built the minimal model, we are now in a much better position to understand the potential impact of
some of the simplifying assumptions wemade. For example, in neglecting direct peer-to-peer communication
(“gossip”), partly for reasons of simplicity and partly through a lack of readily-quantifiable data, we have set
aside exactly the sort of mechanism that might allow consumers to access data on retailers they have not tried
without having to give upwhat they already trust. Amodel where the “trust kernel” involved public rather than
private information would enable buyers to obtain information about other suppliers from their neighbours.
Preliminary tests of this suggest that gossipmaintains the dynamics state for longer, allowing the system to get
closer to the optimised state.
8.7 Another possibility for making the model more realistic is that suppliers could choose to make information
public e.g. by advertising. This does happen to a large extent across Sub-Saharan Africa (Hampshire et al. 2017).
For example, branded drugs are a way for retailers to reveal their wholesaler’s quality. Commercial campaigns
allow suppliers to signal their quality. However, this opens up another trust network beyond what we consider
here, since the consumer has to believe not only that the advertisement is honest, but also the supply chain has
integrity. In addition, for falsified drugs at least, deliberate attempts are also made to fake packaging, tamper
with expiry dates and so on, thus partially undermining the trust that may be available from strategies such as
branding(Hampshire et al. 2017; Hamill et al. 2019).
8.8 A third (empirically observed) way of potentially establishing trust is via signalling of success. In this case the
profitable retailer demonstrates their success with lavish premises, expensive vehicles, etc., while unprofitable
retailers are unable to do so. This allows indirect communication involving peers since their purchasing choices
are eectively reflected in the retailer’s premises. However, as with any ’Signalling Game’, eective interpreta-
tion of the signal depends on knowledge of the specific socio-cultural context. Ostentatious displays of wealth
or success in dierent contextsmay signal rather dierent things: competence, perhaps, but also selfishness or
even corruption(Gambetta & Hamill 2005; Hamill 2011; Hampshire et al. 2017).
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8.9 A fourth possibility is rigorous inspection with publicly available results, both regarding the veracity of adver-
tising claims and the fidelity of the supply chain. If consumers replace trust based on narrow personal ex-
perience with such wider information sources then the “frozen” state monopoly of mediocre drugs could be
broken. However, we know empirically that resources constraints (human, financial and technical) make rig-
orous inspection very diicult to achieve in many LMIC contexts, despite significant investment by WHO and
others(WHO 2017b,a). Moreover, this strategy is fraught with the risk of reaching the “random” final state rather
than the “optimal” one if the supply chain is not, in fact, reliable. (a good illustration of the problem with pol-
icy interventions in complex systems.) Even the most accurate supplier information is irrelevant if the supply
chain lacks integrity. This could be modelled relatively easily by introducing a stochastic degradation of drug
quality at each step of the chain, thus unifying the treatment of substandard and falsified drugs as is necessary
in reality.
8.10 Any or all of these factors could be included in an enhanced version of the model and preliminary testing sug-
gests that they could lead to an optimising system. But each additional element introduces a swathe of cur-
rently unknownparameters. Rather than layering guesswork upon guesswork, for the present, we have chosen
to leave the model available for future use once those parameters are better understood.
8.11 Perhaps the most important result of the model is the demonstration of how the role of trust, at the individual
level, hasmassive eects at the system level. This is a connectionwhich has not been stronglymade in previous
work, and illustrates theneed formoredetailed anthropological studyof how trust in suppliers is built, andhow
it aects decision-making.
8.12 In summary, we introduced aminimalist but ethnographically inspiredmodel for a self-organising pharmaceu-
tical supply chain with trust, variable quality, inspection and geographical aspects. We determined three types
of possible end state. The worst is the “random” outcome where supplies and reliability are always changing.
Next is a “frozen” outcome where suboptimal products achieve an unbreakable hold. Finally there is a more
desirable “dynamic optimising” outcome which is stable but does allow successive invasions of higher qual-
ity drugs. We identified that trust, built on imperfect information, is the critical feature driving system-level
behaviour to one of these three outcomes which vary significantly in social value.
Notes
1The eventual success of the drug is on a scale from 0-2, being the sum of qk and another random number
η accounting for uncertainties including placebo eects and the fact that no drug works for everyone.
2This second feature is built into the strategy rather than found by evolution.
3In this model, the distances are d0/4, 3d0/4, 5d0/4 ...(2n+ 1)d0/4.
4With the exception of the lowest curve which was dominated at the early stages by cheap drugs of below
average quality. Over time, however, trust in these was slowly lost and consumers switched to better quality
drugs.
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